We address the policy debate on whether replacing short-term earnings guidance with long-term earnings guidance reduces managerial myopia through reductions in accruals and real earnings management and excess investment in fixed assets. We employ two event samples to capture long-term guidance: a hand-collected sample of firms that issue earnings-guidance for three to five years ahead and a sample that stops issuing quarterly guidance but continues to issue annual guidance. Using a propensity-score matched design, we find no evidence that long-term guidance firms manage earnings less or are more efficient in their investment decisions. Taken together, our evidence is inconsistent with the view that long-term guidance mitigates managerial myopia.
Introduction
Management frequently issues earnings guidance to communicate expectations of future earnings to the firm's stakeholders. 1 This guidance is usually short-term in nature -forecasting earnings for the upcoming quarter. However, in recent years multiple investor groups and industry organizations argue that short-term guidance encourages managers to myopically focus on short-term results at the expense of long-term performance and investments (e.g., CFA Center We examine whether firms engage in less earnings management and make better investment decisions, as evidenced in less excess investments, once they stop issuing short-term earnings guidance and/or if they issue long-term guidance. This investigation is important as it informs the policy debate on whether firms should replace short-term guidance with long-term guidance: if critics of short-term guidance are correct in their assertion that long-term guidance mitigates managerial myopia, replacing short-term guidance with long-term guidance should yield less earnings management and less over-or under-investment.
To address our research question, we identify two samples of firms that issue long-term earnings guidance from 2000 to 2012. The first sample consists of 854 firm-year observations 2 that issue long-term guidance of earnings three to five years ahead. We hand collect this sample through key-word searches of multiple data sources and refer to this sample as the LTMF sample. The second sample consists of firms that continue to issue annual earnings guidance after discontinuing the issuance of quarterly earnings guidance. We identify 609 firm-year observations using CIG/IBES guidance databases and call this sample our ANNMF sample.
These firms behave as if they are heeding the call from practitioners to provide long-term annual guidance in lieu of quarterly guidance.
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Our empirical investigation proceeds in three steps. To tackle the self-selection inherent in our setting, we first identify firm characteristics associated with the issuance of these longterm guidance. Using propensity-score matched (PSM) control samples constructed from our first-stage probit models, we then examine whether long-term guidance firms exhibit less accruals and real earnings management than their respective control firms, and whether longterm guidance firms exhibit less excess investment in fixed assets.
We find that the LTMF sample -firms that issue earnings guidance for 3-5 years aheadexhibits better stock and accounting performance, lower return volatility, a greater number of long-term forecasts issued by analysts, and longer investment horizon by institutional investors when compared to firms that do not issue this form of guidance. LTMF firms are also more likely to issue dividends. In contrast, firms that continue to issue annual guidance after stopping quarterly guidance (ANNMF firms) have experienced deteriorating performance, increasing uncertainty in their operating and information environment, a decrease in institutional investors'
2 To more closely mirror critics' recommendations, an ideal sample should consist of firms that issue only quarterly guidance but move to issuing only annual guidance or even longer-term guidance. However, over our sampling period, only 515 firms (5501 firm years) appear to issue only quarterly guidance, and of these firms, 35 firms (41 firm years) move from issuing only quarterly guidance to issuing only annual guidance. This is before requiring these observations to have the requisite data. This small sample makes it difficult to implement a meaningful research design.
3 holding horizons and fewer long-term growth forecasts issued by analysts when compared to firms that continue to issue quarterly earnings guidance. These findings are largely consistent with prior research investigating why firms cease guidance (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2011) .
Based on these determinants of long-term guidance, we construct propensity score matched (PSM) control samples for LTMF and ANNMF samples respectively. Our second step of empirical analysis compares the event samples with their PSM control samples on accruals and real earnings management. We use both signed and unsigned discretionary accruals derived from the Jones model (1989) and the Dichow-Dichev model (2002) adjusted for economic performance (Ball and Shivakumar 2006) and discretionary revenue (Stubben 2010) to capture accruals earnings management. We find no evidence that our two event samples exhibit differential accruals earnings management from their respective propensity-score matched control samples in either a univariate or a multivariate setting. Nor do we find evidence of differential real earnings management, proxied by abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs based on Roychowdury (2006) . Lastly, using the McNichols and Stubben (2008) model of excess investment in fixed assets, we find no evidence of improved investment decisions for the two event samples.
Thus, across six different measures of accruals earnings management (signed and unsigned), three different measures of real earnings management, and two different measures of excess investment (signed and unsigned), and using two different event samples to capture the concept of long-term guidance, we do not find evidence of differential earnings management or excess investment between long-term guidance and other firms. We provide no support for the 4 belief held by many practitioners that long-term guidance reduces managerial focus on shortterm results and improves investment decisions.
The evidence in this study informs the current debate on the merits of long-term guidance as a tool to reduce managerial fixation on short-term performance and to facilitate improved investment decisions. While some prominent practitioners argue that the issuance of long-term guidance mitigates managerial myopia, our results do not support this argument.
We contribute to the growing literature motivated by the debate over the costs and benefits of short-term earnings guidance, and more broadly the costs and benefits of guidance in general. Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2011) and Houston, Lev, and Tucker (2010) find that when firms cease earnings guidance, analyst earnings forecast accuracy declines and forecast dispersion increases, impairing the quality of information available to investors. 3 More recently, Call, Chen, Miao, and Tong (2014) find that firms issuing short-term quarterly guidance actually exhibit less, not more earnings management, and Chen, Huang, and Lao (2014) find that guidance firms report more future innovations than non-guidance firms, and that quarterly guidance has a positive incremental impact on future innovation over annual guidance. We extend this literature by evaluating the potential impact of one of the highly touted alternatives to short-term guidance, and find that long-term guidance has no discernable effect on earnings management activity or on investment decisions.
Lastly, the issuance of long-term guidance of earnings three to five years ahead is itself an interesting disclosure choice that has received little attention in the academic literature. We provide the first evidence on such long-term guidance and the characteristics of firms issuing such guidance. Our evidence adds to the academic literature on firms' voluntary disclosure behavior.
We note one important caveat in interpreting our results: our two event samples, LTMF and ANNMF, are both small. This is because in practice only a small number of firms issue longer-term 3~5 year earnings guidance or stop quarterly guidance but continues with annual guidance. Thus, the null results in this paper could be due to lack of power. We do not preclude the possibility that once more firms start replacing short-term guidance with longer term guidance, a researcher may be able to document evidence that long-term guidance indeed mitigates managerial myopia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews relevant literature and develops our empirical predictions. Section three describes our long-term guidance samples and selection of our control samples. Section four presents the research designs and discusses the respective test results. Section five concludes.
Background and empirical predictions
In recent years, influential practitioners and academics have been critical of the practice of giving short-term earnings guidance. Critics allege that short-term earnings guidance fosters managers' myopic behavior such as earnings management and encourages fixation on short-term earnings performance to the detriment of long-term performance and investments (Fuller and Jensen 2010 We recognize that firms issuing long-term earnings guidance may differ systematically from firms that do not. Since these differentiating factors may also be associated with incentives to manage earnings or investment decisions, we compare firms that issue long-term guidance to propensity score matched control samples that exhibit similar characteristics but that do not exhibit the same guidance behavior. We discuss our sampling process below.
Long-Term Guidance Samples and Control Samples for Determinant Tests
An ideal sample to address the policy debate is a sample of firms that truly replace short- It is important to note that, overall, the number of firms issuing LTMF -275 firms -and the number of firms stopping quarterly but continuing with annual guidance (ANNMF firms) -370 unique firms -are small compared to the total number of firms that appear in CIG/IBES guidance database. In addition, 154 out of the 370 firms in ANNMF sample restart issuing quarterly earnings guidance after a four-quarter period of issuing no quarterly guidance. Thus, despite the fact that many prominent investors and important industry groups urge firms to replace short-term guidance with longer term guidance, in practice not so many firms have heeded to such call for longer term guidance or have done so consistently.
Panel B of Table 1 shows some industry clustering of long-term guidance, with the LTMF observations being clustered in the Shops, Consumer Non-Durables, and Money industries, and the ANNMF observations being clustered in the Shops and Business Equipment industries. In our subsequent tests investigating the impact of long-term guidance, we require that the PSM control observations to come from the same year and industry of the event observations, and we also include industry and year fixed effects in our empirical models investigating earnings management and investments in fixed assets.
Research Design and Empirical Results

What determines long-term earnings guidance?
Research design
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Our first objective is to identify factors that differentiate firms issuing long-term 3~5 year earnings guidance (LTMF sample) from other guidance firms, and factors that lead firms to stop issuing quarterly guidance while continuing to issue annual guidance (ANNMF sample). We compare LTMF firms to guidance firms that do not issue 3~5 year guidance (LTMF=0), and ANNMF firms to those that continue to issue quarterly guidance (ANNMF=0), as described in the previous section. This comparison is important as the factors affecting firms' voluntary disclosure behavior can conceivably also impact firms' earnings management behavior and investment decisions. Addressing this question mitigates the endogeneity concern that selfselection contributes to the observed earnings management or investment behavior. This investigation allows us to construct propensity score matched control samples for each of our event samples in our subsequent investigation of the impact of these practices on managerial myopia.
The issuance of long-term 3~5 year earnings forecasts (LTMF) is a distinctly different phenomenon from the much more prevalent practice of issuing quarterly or annual earnings guidance. It is conceivable that firms can only issue longer-term forecasts when they are better able to forecast the future with confidence. This reasoning and our review of the disclosure literature (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Beyer, Collins, Lys, and Walther 2010) lead to the following conjectures: firms are more likely to issue LTMF if they (1) have solid performance (2) have more stable operating and information environment, (3) face greater demand for longterm information from long-term investors. We also conjecture that firms (4) undergoing restructuring and mergers and acquisitions are less able to issue LTMF, as such changes make it more difficult for managers to predict long term. On the other hand, (5) managers who are historically better at forecasting are in a better position to give LTMF. Finally, our reading of the 13 press releases to identify LTMFs shows that (6) firms issuing dividends are more likely to provide longer term information, perhaps to assure investors of the sustainability of dividends.
We use stock returns in the previous twelve months ( ) and the return on assets in the prior year (ROA) to proxy for performance, daily stock return volatility (STD RET ) for the prior year and the number of long-term analyst forecasts (LTAF) in year t-1 to proxy for operating and information environment uncertainty, respectively, and the negative of the average turnover rate of institutional investors (CHURN) in year t-1 to proxy for demand for information from longterm investors. 14 We use an indicator variable equal to one if the firm either had a restructuring event or a merger in year t-1 (ResMA), and capture managers' ability to forecast earnings using a measure of the precision of prior management earnings guidance (PRECISE), where point estimates are considered more precise than range estimates, and range estimates are considered more precise than qualitative forecasts. We capture dividend issuance using an indicator variable DIV coded as one for firms issuing at least two quarterly dividends in year t-1. Detailed definitions of all proxies are tabulated in the Appendix. We estimate the following probit regression for our LTMF sample:
Prior research has investigated why firms stop giving quarterly earnings guidance. For example, Chen et al. (2011) and Houston et al. (2010) find that firms stop when performance declines and uncertainty increases. Though these studies focus on the stopping decision rather than the continuation of annual guidance, they nevertheless provide a starting point for our first 14 investigation. 15 Thus, we conjecture that, compared to control firms that continue to issue quarterly guidance, ANNMF firms experience decreasing stock and accounting performance and increasing uncertainty. We use buy-and-hold return for the past 12 months (RET -12 ) and the change in return on assets from year t-1 to year t (ROA) to proxy for performance change, and year-over-year change in daily stock return volatility (STD RET ) to capture increases in uncertainty in the operating environment and the change in the number of IBS analysts issuing long-term 3~5 year earnings forecasts (LTAF) to capture changes in uncertainty in the information environment. With greater information uncertainty analysts are less able to forecast far into the future. Prior research also finds some evidence that firms stop quarterly guidance when facing investors with longer holding horizons, thus we include CHURN to capture this change in demand for information. Positive CHURN indicates increases in investment horizon of institutional investors and negative CHURN indicates decreases in investment horizons.
Detailed definitions for all variables are offered in the Appendix. We estimate the following probit model:
The changes specification captures the changes in disclosure behavior of ANNMF firms:
these firms change from giving quarterly and annual guidance to only giving annual guidance. 15 We first replicate the Chen et al. (2011) results using their sampling period. Note the Chen et al. (2011) sample is substantially different from our sample, as their research focus is on the stopping of quarterly guidance, not the continuation of annual guidance. Thus, their event sample, the "stopper" sample, consists of firms that stop giving both annual and quarterly earnings guidance -these firms stop appearing in the CIG database in four adjacent quarters after having appeared at least three quarters in the previous adjacent quarters. In addition, their sampling period is 2002 to 2003, whereas our sampling period is much longer covering 2001 -2012 . Houston et al. (2010 has similar sampling procedure as Chen et al. (2011) and their sample period is from Q12002 to Q12005, substantially shorter than our sampling period. 16 We employ this parsimonious model in order to maximize matching on each of the individual factors and also to avoid further data attrition, while noting that results do not change if we augment Equation (1a) with more variables such as analyst forecast dispersion or replacing ROA with a measure based on the frequency of firms meeting or beating analyst forecasts, which is more data-demanding.
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We note that because the ANNMF sample is characterized by firms that change their guidance behavior, as such we employ a changes model (1b) to generate propensity scores, while
we use a levels model in equation (1a) in an effort to differentiate firms that either issue or do not issue long-term guidance of 3~5 year ahead earnings. 
Results of determinants tests
In Panel A of Table 2 we report univariate statistics for the independent variables included in our prediction models, separately for the two event samples and their respective control samples used in the probit regressions. Tests of difference in means and medians reveal that LTMF firms have higher returns and ROA, lower return volatility, and more analysts issuing long-term forecasts, are twice as likely to grant dividends and have institutional investors with longer horizons. However, inconsistent with our predictions, these firms have more incidences of restructuring and M&A activities and lower prior management forecast precision at the univariate level. In contrast, ANNMF firms have experienced decreasing returns and ROA, increasing return volatility and bigger drops in the number of analyst long-term forecasts.
ANNMF firms also exhibit an increase in institutional investors' horizon, though the increase is smaller than that of control firms. In Panel C of Table 2 we tabulate the companion of the matching variables after we generate one-one-one matches for each observation in our two event samples. The matched observations are from the same year and industry and have the closest propensity scores to the event observations. Panel C shows that our matches are largely successful, with the exception of LTAF for the LTMF matched sample and RET -12 for the ANNMF matched sample.
Panel B of
Do managers engage in less earnings management after the issuance of long-term guidance?
Research design
To investigate the potential impact of long-term guidance on managerial myopia, we examine whether the long-term guidance firms differ in the extent to which they engage in accrual-based and real earnings management. We compare the firms in our LTMF and ANNMF samples to PSM control firms based on equations (1a) and (1b) generated above.
We use three proxies to capture the extent of accrual-based earnings management: We estimate the following regression:
EM is one of the three abnormal accruals proxies (ABAC, ABDD, or ABREV) discussed above and outlined in the Appendix. Larger absolute values of these measures indicate more earnings management. LTMF/ANNMF is an indicator variable set to one for LTMF/ANNMF =1 observations, and set to zero for PSM control observations.
Our control variables in Eq. (2a) Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix.
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To capture real earnings management, we employ the three proxies advanced in 
REALEM is one of the above three proxies (DISCFO, DISEXP, or DISPROD) for earnings management through real activities. Our control variables are drawn from Cohen and Zarowin outstanding (LOGSHROUT) requires more earnings management to achieve a given earnings per discretionary revenues best capture managers' use of accounting discretion to manage earnings. In particular, critics are concerned with "accounting shenanigans". Since these concerns are focused on managerial discretion over earnings, rather than on outcomes that potentially follow (e.g., meeting-or-beating benchmarks, restatements, fraud), we assess accruals earnings management by measuring the extent of managerial intervention in the earnings process.
share target. We also include controls for firm size (LOGMV) and performance (ROA), as well as industry and year fixed effects in Eq. (2b).
Accrual-based earnings management test results
We report the results of our accrual-based earnings management tests in Table 3 (absolute values of accruals) and Table 4 (signed accruals).
Univariate statistics in Panel A of Table 3 Table 3 we employ a difference-in-difference design to further examine if ANNMF firms differ from control firms in the extent of their changes in accruals earnings management. We define a dummy variable POST coded as one for the one year after cessation of quarterly guidance and zero for the year before, and interact POST with ANNMF. The results in Panel C show that there is no difference in the extent of accruals earnings management in the year before between event and PSM control samples. In the POST period, ABDD for event firms is marginally higher than control firms (firm-clustered t=1.82), whereas neither ABAC no ABREV are different between event and control firms.
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The results in Table 4, Taken together, the results in Table 3 and Table 4 fail to yield consistent evidence that our two long-term guidance event samples differ in discretionary accruals and discretionary revenues from their respectively PSM control samples. We interpret our results as inconsistent with the assumption that replacing short-term guidance with long-term guidance mitigates accrual-based earnings management.
Real earnings management test results
We report the results of our real earnings management tests in Taken together, these findings are inconsistent with practitioners' assumption that longterm guidance mitigates managerial myopia by limiting real earnings management.
Do managers make more efficient investment decisions following long-term guidance issuance?
Research design
To investigate whether firms make more efficient investment decisions following the issuance of long-term guidance, we use the models developed in McNichols and Stubben (2008) to capture excess investment. We calculate excess investment (|XINVT|) for a seven-year period centered on the event year (Year 0), which is defined as the year when the firm stops giving quarterly but continues with annual guidance (ANNMF sample), or the year the firm issues 3~5 
INVT is investment in capital expenditure taken from the cash flow statements. Detailed variable definitions are offered in the Appendix. We estimate the above two models cross-sectionally each year by industry, with at least 20 observations for each industry-year. We interpret the absolute values of the residuals as excess investment. We then compare the excess investment thus derived across both the event (ANNMF or LTMF) and the PSM control samples for the seven-year window. We also compare the signed values of XINT to gauge the extent of over-or under-investment.
We focus our discussion of the results using the long model, and note that, with a few exceptions, the conclusions are largely the same when using the short model. In untabulated analysis we also compare the simple industry-adjusted means of |XINVT| for the event and control samples and we note that the inference remains the same.
The focus of our attention is the years beginning with Year 0. For the LTMF sample year 0 is defined as the first year in the sampling period when the firm issues LTMF. For the ANNMF sample year 0 is defined as the year the firm stops issuing quarterly guidance. Recall we require the PSM control observations to come from the same industry and year in the matching process, thus all the control observations have a "pseudo" event year year 0 too.
As reported in Collectively, while there is some evidence of lower excess investment for the LTMF firms in Panel A of Table 6 , the findings are marginal. Thus, we conclude that our evidence does not support the view that long-term guidance firms generate less under or over-investment.
Conclusion
Management guidance, in particular shorter-term earnings guidance, has come under considerable scrutiny from many investor and industry organizations in recent years (e.g., CFA Using a propensity score matched design, we test whether this underlying assumption holds by examining the impact of long-term guidance on 1) the extent of accruals earnings management and real earnings management, and on 2) the extent of excess investment.
As there is no clear definition of what constitutes long-term guidance, we construct two samples that most closely approximate the concept of long-term guidance in practice: the first sample of firms, the LTMF sample, has issued guidance for earnings 3~5 years ahead. We hand collect this sample using key-word searchers over multiple databases over 2000-2013 and identify 275 unique firms and 854 firm-year observations. The second sample of firms, the ANNMF sample, ceases giving quarterly guidance but continues to issue annual guidance. We obtain this sample using machine-readable data from CIG/IBES guidance databases and identify 370 firms with 609 firm-year observations from 2001-2012. Note that despite repeated calls from practitioner groups and prominent academics for firms to replace short-term guidance with long-term guidance, the number of firms doing so over a 12-year period is small compared to the population of firms issuing guidance (3,279 unique firms).
To investigate the impact of long-term guidance issuance on earnings management and investment decisions, we first estimate probit regressions to capture the determinants of longterm guidance by comparing 1) LTMF firms with CIG/IBES guidance firms that do not issue 3~5 year ahead earnings guidance, and 2) ANNMF firms with CIG/IBES guidance firms that continue to issue quarterly guidance.
We find LTMF firms have better performance, lower uncertainty, more long-term analyst growth forecasts, and their institutional owners have longer investment horizons. These firms are 25 also more likely to issue dividends. In contrast, ANNMF firms have experienced declining performance and increases in uncertainty, consistent with prior research (Chen et al. 2011; Houston et al. 2010) . We generate propensity score matched control samples based on our determinant tests and require control observations for our two event samples to come from the same industry and same year as the event observations.
We use three abnormal accruals measures (signed and unsigned) to capture accruals We capture excess investments (signed and unsigned) using the two expectations models for investment in fixed assets advanced in McNichols and Stubben (2008) , and tabulate the level of excess investment over a seven year window, centered on the year when firms start issuing 3~5 year earnings guidance (LTMF sample) and the year when firms discontinue quarterly guidance (for ANNMF sample). Again, we fail to find consistent evidence of a difference in excess investment.
Taken as a whole, our evidence does not support the view that long-term guidance mitigates managerial myopia. The evidence in this study helps inform the current policy debate on the merits of long-term guidance as a tool to reduce managerial myopia. While some prominent practitioners and academics believe replacing short-term guidance with long-term guidance can mitigate managers' focus on short-term results, our results do not support this argument.
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Our paper also adds to the growing literature motivated by the debate on the costs and benefits of short-term guidance in particular and both short-term and long-term guidance in general. Recent research shows that, contrary to popular belief, firms issuing quarterly guidance exhibit less, not more, accruals earnings management (Call et al. 2014 ). In addition, concurrent research shows that guidance firms generate a higher number of patents and patent citations when compared to non-guiders (Chen, Huang, and Lao 2014). The greater extent of innovation exists not only when firms give annual guidance, but also when firms give quarterly guidance.
We extend this body of research by focusing on the potential impact of long-term earnings guidance on earnings management behavior and investment decisions. Our research provides the first step toward a better understanding of the impact of long-term guidance on managerial shorttermism and we believe further insights can be gained from more research in this area. ) + ε it . ACC is total accruals calculated from statement of cash flow (SCF) data as earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations. (Quarterly earnings before extraordinary items and quarterly cash flow from operations are calculated using the year-to-date data items IBCY and OANCFY in Compustat.) ΔREV is change in revenue (SALE). NPPE is net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) at the beginning of the year (quarter). (We use net PP&E at the beginning of the quarter because quarterly gross PP&E (PPEGTQ) is missing for a large number of observations in Compustat.) INDADJ_CFO is annual (quarterly) cash flow from operations minus the median cash flow from operations for all firms in the same industry (based on 2-digit SIC code) in the same year (quarter). DIND is a dummy variable set to one if INDADJ_CFO is less than zero and set to zero otherwise. All variables except DIND are deflated by average total assets (AT), and all input variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 and 99 % level. The absolute value of the regression residuals (ε i,t ) is multiplied by 100. Larger values of ABAC indicate more earnings management ABDD Absolute value of the residuals from the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model after controlling for economic losses as in Ball and Shivakumar (2006) . The following regression model is estimated annually (quarterly) for each industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes) with at least 20 observations: ACC it = β 0 + β 1 CFO it-1 + β 2 CFO it + β 3 CFO it+1 + β 4 DIND it + β 5 (DIND it × INDADJ_CFO it ) +ε it . ACC is total accruals calculated from statement of cash flow (SCF) data as earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations. (Quarterly earnings before extraordinary items and quarterly cash flow from operations are calculated using the year-to-date data items IBCY and OANCFY in Compustat.) INDADJ_CFO is cash from operations minus the median cash from operations for all firms in the same industry (based on 2-digit SIC code) in the same year (quarter). DIND is a dummy variable set to one if INDADJ_CFO is less than zero, and set to zero otherwise. All variables except DIND are deflated by average total assets (AT). The absolute values of the regression residuals (ε i,t ) are multiplied by 100. Higher values of ABDD indicate more earnings management.
ABREV
Absolute value of the residuals based on the Stubben (2010) model. The following regression model is estimated annually for each industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) with at least 20 observations: ΔAR it = β 0 + β 1 ΔR1_3 it + β 2 ΔR4 it + ε it . ΔAR is annual change in accounts receivables (RECT). ΔR1_3 is change in the revenues of the first three quarters. ΔR4 is the change in revenues of the fourth quarter. For the quarterly tests, the following regression model is estimated quarterly for each industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) with at least 20 observations:
ΔAR iq = β 0 + β 1 (1/ASSET iq ) + β 2 ΔR iq + ε iq . ΔAR is quarterly change in accounts receivables (RECTQ). ΔR is the quarterly change in revenue (SALEQ). ASSET is average total assets (ATQ). ΔR and ΔAR are both deflated by average total assets (ATQ), and all input variables are winsorized at the extreme 1 % and 99 % level. The absolute value of the Variables Definition regression residuals (ε i,t ), is multiplied by 100. Larger values of ABREV indicate more earnings management. ANNMF 1 if the firm issues at least 3 quarterly management forecasts in four consecutive quarters, but 0 quarterly management forecasts and at least 1 annual management forecast in the following four consecutive quarters. 0 if the firm issues at least 3 quarterly management forecasts in the first four consecutive quarters, and at least 3 quarterly management forecasts in the following four consecutive quarters.
BTM
Ratio of book to market value of equity calculated as book value of equity (CEQ) scaled by market value of equity (CSHO × PRCC_F). CAPINT Capital intensity calculated as net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) divided by total assets (AT).
CF
Total cash flow taken from the cash flow statements.
σ(CFO)
Standard deviation of annual cash flow (OANCF) deflated by average total assets. Standard deviations are calculated over the prior 10 years. A minimum of 5 years of data is required for the calculation σCFO.
CHURN
Weighted-average turnover rate of all institutional investors of the firm, multiplied by negative one. Turnover rate is measured at the end of year t, and defined using the methodology in Gaspar et al. (2005) . Note the Gaspar et al. (2005) measure captures the average turn-over rate of all institutional investors for a given firm at a given time, thus it is negatively correlated with the average investment horizon of a firm's institutional investors. Since we multiply this turnover rate with negative one, higher CHURN indicates longer investment horizon of institutional investors. ΔCHURN Year over year change in CHURN. Positive  CHURN indicate increases in long-term institutional holdings, and vice versa for negative  CHURN.
DISCFO
Abnormal operating cash flows, measured as the residuals from the following regression:
The regression model is estimated annually for each industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes) with at least 20 observations. CFO is cash flow from operations (OANCF). REV is revenue (SALE). A is total assets (AT). Lower values of DISCFO indicate greater extent of real management.
DISEXP
Abnormal discretionary expenses, measured as the residuals from the following regression:
The regression model is estimated annually for each industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes) with at least 20 observations. DISEXP is SG&A expenses (XSGA).
REV is revenue (SALE). A is total assets (AT). Lower values of DISEXP indicate greater extent of real management. DISPROD
Abnormal production costs, measured as the residuals from the following regression:
The regression model is estimated annually for each industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes) with at least 20 observations. PROD is production cost, measured as the sum of COGS and increase in inventory (COGS -INVCH) . REV is revenue (SALE). A is total assets (AT 1 annual forecast and 0 quarterly forecasts Table 1 Distribution of LTMF and ANNMF 
